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ABSTRACT
We conduct a panel data analysis of 74 countries over 1980 n2000 to investigate whether population
health affects foreign direct investment inflows. Our main finding is that health has a positive and
significant effect on such inflows for low- and middle-income countries. This finding is consistent
with the view that health is an integral component of human capital in developing countries.
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As Ralph Waldo Emerson famously wrote in the 19th century, "Health is the first 
wealth". Sickness and disability constrain human capability and have a negative impact on 
welfare (Bloom, Canning, and Jamison, 2004). In addition to the importance of health as a 
consumption good, health can also be viewed as a form of human capital that enhances economic 
performance both for the individual and at the level of the macroeconomy.   
Health affects economic performance through direct and indirect mechanisms (Bloom 
and Canning, 2000). It has a direct effect on workers’ productivity because healthy workers are 
generally more physically and mentally robust than those afflicted with disease or disability and 
are less likely to be absent from work because of personal or household illness. Microeconomic 
analyses using anthropometric measures (such as onset of menarche, stature, and nutritional 
status) as well as indexes of morbidity, have consistently demonstrated that health affects 
earnings and productivity (Knaul, 1999; Ribero, 1999; Savedoff and Schultz, 2000; Schultz and 
Tansel, 1997).  
Health can also affect economic performance through indirect mechanisms; for example, 
improved health can increase the return to other forms of human capital, such as education and 
worker experience. Healthier children have enhanced cognitive function and higher school 
attendance, allowing them to become better educated, higher earning adults (Bhargava, 2001). In 
addition, healthier workers, who have lower rates of absenteeism and longer life expectancies, 
acquire more job experience.  
At the macroeconomic level, a substantial body of evidence has demonstrated that 
population health is a robust predictor of growth in per capita income (Barro, 1991; Bhargava et 2 
 
al., 2001; Bloom, Canning, & Sevilla, 2004). However, countries may benefit to different 
degrees from health; Bhargava et al. (2001) argue that economic growth resulting from health 
improvements is more pronounced in developing countries than in industrial countries.   
  Health, viewed as a form of human capital, could affect foreign direct investment (FDI) 
through several mechanisms.
1 The World Health Organization’s Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health (2001) suggests that a healthy workforce is important when 
attracting foreign direct investment due to the effect of health on worker productivity.  In 
addition, for fear of endangering their own health and that of their expatriate staff, foreign 
investors may shun areas where disease is rampant and where access to health care is limited.
2  
A classic instance of disease interfering with investment was during the building of the 
Panama Canal. Yellow fever and other pathogens claimed the lives of 10,000 to 20,000 workers 
between 1882 and 1888, forcing Ferdinand de Lesseps and the French to abandon the 
construction project (Jones, 1990). More recently, the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) has exemplified how disease, or even the fear of disease, can dampen 
investment: FDI inflows into mainland China declined by US$2.7 billion during 2003 (Business 
Daily Update, 2003). Similarly, FDI inflows to Hong Kong fell 62% in one quarter (Tam, 2003). 
These trends quickly reversed once the outbreak was controlled, but they suggest that lengthier 
epidemics, such as HIV/AIDS or malaria, could have severe, long-term effects on FDI.
3  
Even though circumstantial evidence suggests a link between health and FDI, empirical 
findings are noticeably absent. The gap in the literature is not without consequence. While other 
sources of capital market flows and official development assistance to developing countries have 
steadily declined, FDI has continued to rise and now represents the largest component of net 
resource flows to developing countries (Miyamoto, 2003). In addition to providing employment 3 
 
opportunities and financial capital, FDI can generate positive externalities, such as transferring 
technology and skills and increasing access to global markets (Lim, 2001; UNCTAD, 2003). 
 These potential benefits are particularly relevant for developing countries and many are 
actively seeking to attract greater FDI inflows. Many countries have already implemented 
business facilitation measures, created investment promotion agencies, and liberalized their 
investment frameworks (Asiedu and Lien, 2004; UNCTAD, 1998). One consequence of the 
convergence of national FDI policies is that it has become more difficult for a country to 
distinguish itself based on economic policy alone (UNCTAD, 1998). In this paper we investigate 
the role of population health as a possible factor that encourages inflows of FDI.
4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the theory of FDI 
and the empirical model used in the analysis, Section 3 details the data used and our sources, 
Section 4 presents our empirical results, and Section 5 concludes. To the best of our knowledge, 




2. THE MODEL 
Firms invest abroad instead of, say, exporting or licensing to a local company, to satisfy 
one of two strategic objectives. They may seek to better serve the local market, producing locally 
to avoid transportation costs, trade barriers, or production delays, and speed information flow; 
this is market-seeking or horizontal FDI.  Alternatively,  they may seek to produce for the global 
market but select this location to minimize production costs through lower-cost inputs; this is 
export-oriented or vertical FDI (Shatz and Venables, 2000).  4 
 
Following Asiedu (2002) and Blonigen and Wang (2004), we conjecture that horizontal 
FDI will be driven largely by domestic demand (market size). Local production allows a firm to 
avoid transportation costs and import duties, but this is only attractive if the domestic market is 
sufficiently large to cover the fixed costs of setting up production and any country-specific cost 
disadvantages. Investigators have traditionally found that host market size, usually measured in 
terms of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population size, is a positive 
determinant of FDI inflows (Chakrabarti, 2001; Schneider and Frey, 1985; Wheeler and Mody, 
1992). By contrast, ceteris paribus, vertical FDI will flow to countries that possess cheap, 
productive inputs and have the fewest restrictions on trade. The presence of highly educated 
healthy workers, available at low wages, may be a large inducement for vertical FDI. 
   We model the gross level of FDI inflows at time t in country i as follows:  
 
log FDIit = a + α log Pop it + β log GDP per cap it + θ Health it + µ log Edu it + γ Xit + Dt + εit, 
 
where Pop is total population and X  represents a set of control variables. We include time 
dummies, Dt, to capture changes in the volume of global international investment flows, and ε 
represents the error term.  
  Our FDI measure is gross inflows. Many researchers use other measures, for example, net 
inflows, but we prefer gross inflows for two reasons. First, this measure seems more appropriate 
for investigating the incentives for foreign businesses to invest in a particular country. Second, in 
terms of knowledge spillovers, which may be a central benefit of FDI, it is the gross inflows that 
matter and not net inflows. 5 
 
  Population and GDP per capita can be considered as scale variables that capture market 
size effects. However, GDP per capita can also be thought of as a proxy for labor costs 
(assuming a fairly fixed share of labor income in total GDP). The coefficient on GDP per capita 
should therefore be interpreted with caution, because it may reflect both a market size and a cost 
effect. The literature commonly normalizes FDI flows by dividing by some scale variable, for 
example, population or GDP. We prefer not to impose a particular normalization or scale factor, 
instead estimating a relationship. Our log formulation allows for normalization by population or 
GDP as special cases. For example, in the case of population we can transform our equation as 
follows: 
 
log (FDI/Pop)it = a + (α-1) log Pop it + β log GDP per cap it + θ Health it + µ log Edu it + γ Xit + Dt + εit. 
 
It follows that we can test if normalizing by population is a valid method of measuring the scale 
effect by estimating the original equation and testing the restriction that α = 1. A coefficient on 
population different from unity suggests that a simple normalization achieved by dividing FDI 
by population does not fully capture the scale effect of population size. Similarly, normalizing 
FDI by total GDP gives an equation with a coefficient of  α – 1 on log population and  1 β −  on 
log GDP per capita, without changing any of the other coefficients.   
  At a given level of labor costs, proxied in our model by GDP per capita, our theory 
suggests that countries with higher levels of education and health should have more productive 
workers and should be more attractive to foreign investors. We use life expectancy at birth to 
proxy the health of a country’s population. We would prefer a measure of health that explicitly 
accounts not only for mortality rates, but also for the morbidity effects of ill-health. However, 
Murray and Lopez (1996) demonstrate that higher life expectancy is associated with lower 6 
 
morbidity and overall better health status. Furthermore, Shastry and Weil (2002) report that the 
survival rate of adult males is linearly related to adult male height, which is often used as a 
measure of health (human) capital. These findings establish a relationship between mortality and 
morbidity measurements.  
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), who argue that secondary schooling is the 
best measure of education for predicting economic growth, our educational stock measure is the 
log of the percentage of the population aged 25 or above who have completed secondary 
schooling (Cohen and Soto, 2001).  
We follow the literature for the inclusion of other relevant control variables, including 
openness of the economy, infrastructure, quality of governance, and distance to major world 
markets. Openness of the economy to trade is especially important for firms seeking to export 
products from the host country to the global market, as tariffs, quotas, and other forms of capital 
controls will diminish firms’ profits (Asiedu and Lien, 2004). Openness is required not only with 
respect to exports, but also for imports, because many FDI ventures may require the purchase of 
intermediate inputs from abroad. We employ the ratio of trade (imports + exports) to GDP as our 
measure of openness.  
Governance is increasingly being identified as a key factor that firms evaluate when 
choosing to invest abroad (Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova, 1998; MIGA and Deloitte & 
Touche, 2002). In particular, the quality of bureaucratic institutions affects FDI inflows 
(Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; Stein and Daude, 2001). Wei (2000) finds that corruption has a 
strong negative impact on the location of FDI. We use Knack and Keefer (1995) indexes of 
bureaucratic quality and corruption in government. 7 
 
Good infrastructure in the form of transportation and communication networks can 
increase firm productivity and help attract foreign investment. We employ telephone mainlines 
per 1,000 population as a proxy for host country infrastructure. However, this measure has its 
shortcomings, as it only accounts for the availability and not the reliability of the infrastructure, 
which may be particularly problematic in poor countries where support for infrastructure may be 
lacking (Asiedu, 2002).  
We also investigate whether geography affects the distribution of FDI inflows. 
Transportation costs and distance from the home country are commonly included in gravity 
models of international investment and may affect a firm’s decision about where to locate abroad 
(Brainard, 1997; Yigang, 2003). Although Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) find that 
distance to major markets is not a robust FDI determinant, we include distance from major 
markets as a possible control variable in our analysis. 
In addition, Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) argue that the economies of coastal 
regions, with their easy access to international trade through sea lanes, should outperform the 
economies of inland areas. While inland areas can access markets through rail or road links, 
these are often much more expensive forms of transportation. Thus we include a dummy variable 
for whether a country is landlocked with the stipulation that the country is not located in Western 
or Central Europe (countries in Western and Central Europe have close proximity to a major 
market and the absence of sea routes may not matter).  
3. DATA 
The empirical analysis employs panel data for a set of 74 countries observed over the last 
two decades. A list of countries used in the analysis is provided in Table 1. A summary of data 
sources and variable descriptions is provided in Table 2. We use all countries for which data are 8 
 
available, but exclude major petroleum exporters, because for these countries our measure of 




[insert tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
The dependent variable, gross FDI inflows, is based on annual data averaged over each 
decade. We constructed gross FDI inflows using data from the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2003). The World Development Indicators does not include data on gross inflows 
directly, but does provide data on total gross flows (the sum of gross inflows and gross outflows) 
and on net inflows (gross inflows minus gross outflows), from which gross inflows can be 
derived.
7 
All explanatory variables are taken at the beginning of the relevant time period.
8 
Summary statistics for the full sample are presented in Table 3. The correlation coefficients for 
the full sample of 74 countries are presented in Table 4. Life expectancy ranks second only to 
GDP per capita in strength of raw correlation to log gross FDI inflows.  
 
[insert tables 3 and 4 about here] 
 
4. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
Table 5 reports our panel data estimates for the full sample of 74 countries with up to two 
observations per country, one for 1980–90 and one for 1990–2000.  All reported regressions 9 
 
passed the Ramsey RESET test for model misspecification. In addition, we estimate 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
 
[insert table 5 about here] 
 
Column (1) of Table 5 reports results for an ordinary least squares specification that is 
representative of the FDI literature. The coefficients on income per capita and total population, 
our indicators of market size, are positive and strongly significant, and this remains true for all 
our specifications. Corruption is not significantly different from zero in our specifications, yet 
the other governance measure, quality of bureaucratic institutions, is both significant and positive 
in the model. Adding life expectancy in column (2) demonstrates that health is a statistically 
significant predictor of gross FDI inflows at the 1% level and is robust to adding education in 
column (3). The results indicate that every additional year of life expectancy increases FDI 
inflows by about 7% among the full sample of countries.  
The other component of human capital, education, has a positive coefficient, but is not 
statistically significant.  This finding is consistent with the conflicting evidence on the 
importance of education in determining inflows of FDI. Root and Ahmed (1979), as well as 
Schneider and Frey  (1985), report that education does not significantly affect FDI flows to 
developing countries. More recently, however, Noorbakhsh and Paloni (2001) and Globerman 
and Shapiro (2002) argue that education does have a positive and significant impact on foreign 
investment and that its effect has been increasing over time. The reason for the poorly 
determined coefficient on secondary schooling in our model could be due to measurement error 
in the data on education that biases the estimated coefficient toward zero (see Krueger and 10 
 
Lindahl, 2001). We also tried other measures of education, such as the number of accumulated 
years of education in the population aged 15–64 and school enrollment rates, but did not find any 
measure that produced a statistically significant effect. 
We further test for robustness by adding infrastructure and geographic variables that are 
also postulated to be determinants of FDI inflows: including telephones as a proxy for 
infrastructure, a dummy variable for landlocked status and distance to major markets. The results 
reported in column (4) indicate that the coefficient on life expectancy is robust to these alternate 
specifications, though many of the controls do not themselves appear to be statistically 
significant.  
Recent evidence suggests that pooling data from industrial and developing countries in 
empirical FDI studies may yield misleading coefficient estimates (Blonigen and Wang, 2004). 
We might expect that developing countries are more dependent on export-oriented, vertical FDI, 
while industrial countries are more attractive for market-seeking, horizontal FDI. Of particular 
relevance to the current study, we noted a gap in average life expectancy between income 
groups: 75.2 years for high-income countries versus 59.4 years for low- and middle-income 
countries. Diminishing returns to health might well make it a more important investment in low-
income countries. We therefore analyze the model using two restricted samples, one of low- and 
middle-income countries and one of high-income countries selected on the basis of the World 
Bank’s income classification.
9,10 
The results for low- and middle-income countries are reported in Table 6. The model 
being estimated in Table 6 is identical to that reported in Table 5, the only difference being the 
sample. The results are broadly similar to those in Table 5. The coefficient on openness is 
somewhat larger than before, which is consistent with foreign investment to developing countries 11 
 
being mainly export-oriented. Life expectancy once again has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on FDI. The large decrease in the coefficient on GDP per capita when we add 
life expectancy to the model indicates that when health is excluded from the model, GDP per 
capita is, to some extent, serving as a proxy for health in low- and middle-income countries. 
The effect of population health on FDI inflows is robust to adding education and other 
control variables. Our results suggest that every additional year of life expectancy leads to about 
a 9% increase in gross FDI flows to low- and middle-income countries.  
 
[insert table 6 about here] 
 
The index of corruption is now significant, but of the wrong sign. The results suggest that 
higher levels of corruption are associated with higher levels of FDI in low- and middle-income 
countries. This finding, although perhaps surprising, agrees with Stein and Daude’s (2001) and 
Wheeler and Mody’s (1992) results. It is also consistent with Alesina and Weder (1999), who 
argue that the relationship between corruption and economic performance is complicated. Some 
types of corruption may allow the relatively efficient provision of services to foreign firms, its 
main effect being on the distribution of domestic economic gains with little distortion of 
productive activities.  
Table 7 uses the same specifications as Table 5 for a restricted sample of high-income 
countries. The sample size now becomes quite small and may lead to some variables becoming 
statistically insignificant simply because of a lack of power; therefore, these results should be 
treated with caution. Unlike the results reported from the previous two samples, openness, GDP 
per capita and bureaucratic quality are not statistically significant. The lack of significance of 12 
 
openness is consistent with the theory that FDI going to industrial countries is mainly to access 
their markets rather than to export.  
 
[insert table 7 about here] 
 
Even though GDP per capita does not have a significant impact on FDI inflows, the other 
proxy of market size, total population, is highly significant at the 1 percent level. The lack of 
significance of GDP per capita could be due to a balancing of the market size effects with the 
cost of production effect, which tends to work in the opposite direction.  
Reduced corruption does appear to have a positive and significant impact on FDI in this 
sample, indicating that the type of corruption, or the way it affects the economy, may differ 
between industrial and developing countries.  
Most important from our point of view, health is not statistically significant in any 
specification among high-income countries. This is consistent with the view that the worker 
productivity effects of health differentials appear mainly in developing countries, although our 




This paper provides empirical evidence that health is indeed a positive and statistically 
significant determinant of FDI inflows to low- and middle-income countries. These results are 
robust to adding control variables, such as education, infrastructure, and income per capita. By 
contrast, improved health does not appear to contribute significantly to the attractiveness of high-13 
 
income countries to foreign investors. Our findings support the results of Bhargava et al., (2001), 
who find diminishing returns to health as a factor in economic growth. Our results are also 
consistent with those of Blonigen and Wang (2004), who argue that the underlying factors that 
determine the level of FDI activity vary systematically across countries at different stages of 
development.  
Our main result is that a one-year improvement in life expectancy contributes to about a 
9% increase in gross FDI inflows to low- and middle-income countries. Our findings are 
consistent with the literature that links health to increased worker productivity and suggest that 
the payoff to population health improvements should also include an elevated rate of FDI 
inflows.   14 
 
Table 1. List of countries 
 
High-income countries  Low- and middle-income countries 
Australia Argentina  Madagascar 
Austria Bangladesh  Malawi 
Belgium Bolivia  Malaysia 
Canada Brazil Mali 
Cyprus Bulgaria  Mexico 
Denmark Burkina  Faso  Morocco 
Finland Cameroon  Mozambique 
France Chile  Nicaragua 
Germany China Niger 
Greece Colombia  Panama 
Ireland Costa  Rica  Paraguay 
Italy Dominican  Republic  Peru 
Japan Ecuador  Philippines 
Netherlands El  Salvador Romania 
New Zealand  Ethiopia  Senegal 
Norway Ghana  Sierra  Leone 
Portugal Guatemala  South  Africa 
Singapore Guyana Sudan 
Spain Haiti  Tanzania 
Sweden Honduras  Thailand 
Switzerland Hungary Tunisia 
United Kingdom  India  Turkey 
United States  Jamaica  Uganda 
 Jordan  Uruguay 
 Kenya  Zambia 
   Zimbabwe 15 
 
Table 2. Variable definitions and sources 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
Log gross FDI inflows   Calculated from gross FDI (percentage 
of GDP), FDI, net inflows (percentage 
of GDP) and GDP (constant 1995 US$); 
see text for details 
World Bank (2003) 
Log total population  Population, total    World Bank (2003) 
Log GDP per capita   GDP per capita, PPP (constant 1995 
international $)  
World Bank (2004) 
Openness of  
economy 
Sum of imports of goods and services 
(percentage of GDP)  and exports of 
goods and services (percentage of GDP) 
World Bank (2003) 
Life expectancy  Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  World Bank (2003) 
Telephones   Telephone mainlines (per 1000 
population) 
World Bank (2003) 
Log education  Percentage of population aged 25 or 
over who have completed secondary 
education 
Cohen and Soto 
(2001) 
Bureaucratic quality  Index with 0–6 range, with higher 
values indicating “better” ratings 




Index with 0–6 range, with higher  
values indicating “better” ratings 
Knack and Keefer 
(1995) 
Distance to major 
markets  
The minimum Great-Circle (air) 
distance in 1000 kilometers from the 
country’s capital city to the closest 
major port: New York, Rotterdam, or 
Tokyo  
Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999) 
Landlocked   Indicator for landlocked country (1 if 
landlocked, zero otherwise), excluding 
countries in Western and Central Europe 
(Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Slovakia, and Switzerland)  
Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger (1999) 
 PPP Purchasing power parity.  16 
 












Log gross FDI 
inflows  24.453 2.833  17.859  30.371 
Log total 
population  16.381 1.387  13.323  20.850 
Log GDP per 

























expectancy  64.577 11.104  35.196  78.837 
Log education  -2.561  1.316  -6.624  -0.580 
Telephones 149.455  184.731 0.700 680.800 
Distance to  
major markets   3.890 2.774  0.140  9.280 
Landlocked 0.135  0.343  0  1 
 17 
 



























Log gross FDI 
inflows  1                  
 
Log total 
population  0.398 1                   
 
Log GDP per 
capita  0.813 0.029  1                 
 
Openness of 
economy  0.105 -0.448  0.177  1               
 
Bureaucratic 
quality  0.718 0.169  0.743  0.165  1             
 
Corruption in 
government  0.592 0.055  0.644  0.227  0.864  1           
 
Life 
expectancy  0.811 0.096  0.901  0.207  0.598  0.572  1         
 
 
Log education  0.720 0.104  0.797  0.111  0.554  0.463  0.785  1       
 
 
Telephones  0.731 0.052  0.834  0.137  0.786  0.733  0.703  0.691  1     
 
Distance to 
major markets  -0.510 -0.154  -0.571  -0.147  -0.413  -0.325  -0.527  -0.470  -0.540  1   
 
 
Landlocked  -0.436 -0.179  -0.457  -0.077  -0.337  -0.231  -0.512  -0.405  -0.294  0.361  1 18 
 
Table 5. Full sample (74 countries) 
dependent variable: log gross FDI inflows 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant -5.057**  -2.492  -1.187  -1.063 
 (1.991)  (1.783)  (2.314)  (2.657) 
        
Log total population in base year  0.840*** 0.761***  0.756*** 0.768*** 
 (0.116)  (0.095)  (0.093)  (0.093) 
        
Log GDP per capita in base year  1.655*** 0.970***  0.898*** 0.785*** 
 (0.126)    (0.235)  (0.249)  (0.297) 
        
Openness of economy in base year 0.009*  0.007**  0.007** 0.008*** 
 (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
        
Bureaucratic quality  0.196*  0.324***  0.319***  0.381*** 
 (0.103)  (0.105)  (0.106)  (0.127) 
        
Corruption in government  0.015  -0.057  -0.044  -0.171 
 (0.106)  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.114) 
        
Life expectancy in base year   0.070***  0.065*** 0.075*** 
   (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.024) 
        
Log education in base year      0.120  0.110 
     (0.154)  (0.125) 
        
Telephones in base year        0.001 
       (0.001) 
        
Distance to major markets        0.018 
       (0.043) 
        
Landlocked       0.247 
       (0.333) 
        
Dummy 1990–2000  1.027***  0.921***  0.903***  0.751*** 
 (0.206)  (0.198)  (0.206)  (0.202) 
        
Observations 137  137  137  130 
Adjusted R-squared  0.85  0.86  0.86  0.86 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent (White) standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level.  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 19 
 
Table 6. Low- and middle-income country sample (51 countries) 
dependent variable: log gross FDI inflows 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -6.385**  -0.078  0.590  -2.112 
  (3.017) (3.017) (3.280) (3.723) 
      
Log total population in base year  0.912*** 0.685*** 0.682*** 0.739*** 
  (0.176)  (0.148)   (0.148)   (0.151) 
      
Log GDP per capita in base year 1.654***  0.663** 0.643*  0.795* 
  (0.162)  (0.329)   (0.332)   (0.439) 
      
Openness of economy in base year  0.015** 0.009  0.009 0.014** 
  (0.007)  (0.007)   (0.006)   (0.006) 
      
Bureaucratic quality  0.311*  0.553***  0.538***  0.542*** 
  (0.167)  (0.146)   (0.153)   (0.165) 
      
Corruption in government  -0.149  -0.343**  -0.320**  -0.360** 
  (0.151)  (0.130)   (0.146)   (0.179) 
      
Life expectancy in base year   0.093***  0.089*** 0.091** 
    (0.027)   (0.029)   (0.035) 
      
Log education in base year      0.067  0.021 
     (0.191)  (0.206) 
      
Telephones in base year        -0.002 
       (0.007) 
      
Distance to major markets        0.036 
       (0.081) 
      
Landlocked       0.293 
       (0.473) 
      
Dummy 1990-2000  1.133***  0.949***  0.936***  0.869** 
 (0.301)  (0.276)  (0.289)    (0.330) 
      
Observations  90 90 90 86 
Adjusted  R-squared  0.71 0.74 0.73 0.72 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent (White) standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level.  
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 20 
 
Table 7. High–income country sample (23 countries) 
dependent variable: log gross FDI inflows 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant 1.298  0.378  -2.744  -1.409 
 (6.173)  (9.971)  (11.346)  (11.443) 
        
Log total population in base year  0.821*** 0.822***  0.791*** 0.848*** 
 (0.094)  (0.099)  (0.106)  (0.269)   
        
Log GDP per capita in base year  0.952  0.921  1.238  1.527 
 (0.700)  (0.749)  (1.093)  (1.004) 
        
Openness of economy in base year 0.005  0.005  0.005  0.005 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.015) 
        
Bureaucratic quality  0.180  0.196  0.174  0.101 
 (0.204)  (0.260)  (0.249)  (0.280) 
        
Corruption in government  0.235*  0.230  0.258  0.319** 
 (0.137)  (0.151)  (0.161)  (0.134)   
        
Life expectancy in base year    0.015  0.019  -0.066 
   (0.124)  (0.124)  (0.116) 
        
Log education in base year      -0.202  -0.513 
     (0.303)  (0.312) 
        
Telephones in base year        0.002 
       (0.002) 
        
Distance to major markets         (0.026) 
       0.091 
        
Landlocked       0 
       0 
        
Dummy 1990-2000  0.856***  0.832***  0.802***  0.719** 
 (0.233)  (0.252)  (0.256)  (0.321)   
        
Observations 45  45  45  43 
Adjusted R-squared  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.80 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent (White) standard errors are in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 10% level.  
** Significant at the 5% level.  
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1 Lucas (1990) conjectures that differences in human capital could account for the failure of international capital 
flows to equalize capital-labor ratios across countries.  
2 In addition to normal risks, foreign investors and their managerial staff may lack resistance to disease, either 
acquired or inherited, that the host country population enjoys. For example, a significant portion of the population in 
Africa carries the sickle cell trait. This condition confers protection from severe malaria and is much less common 
among European descendants (Pasvol, Weatherall, and Wilson, 1978). 
3 Indeed, preliminary evidence supports this hypothesis. A global business survey on HIV/AIDS sponsored by the 
World Economic Forum (Bloom et al., 2003) suggests that half of all business leaders in low-income countries 
believe HIV affects their country’s access to FDI. Similarly, Gallup and Sachs (2001) conjecture that malaria deters 
FDI.  
4 The interest in human capital is partly attributable to recent trends in investment flows away from the primary 
goods sector toward the services sector, thereby increasing the demand for skilled labor inputs. Thus investigators 
have hypothesized that locations where the accumulated level of human capital is high may attract greater FDI 
inflows (Blomström and Kokko, 2003; Noorbakhsh and Paloni, 2001). However, most cross-country studies identify 
human capital narrowly with education, ignoring strong reasons for considering health as an integral component of 
worker productivity, and hence important for determining the distribution of FDI. 
5 Globerman and Shapiro (2002) do regress FDI on the human development index (HDI), which is a composite of 
the following: GDP per capita, educational literacy, and enrollment and life expectancy at birth. We directly 
investigate the effect of health on FDI. 
6 The 20 major petroleum producers are Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Republic of Congo, Gabon, 
Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Yemen (based on the 
classification by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development—see 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=2162&lang=1). 
7 We calculated gross FDI inflows using the following two relationships: 
gross FDI (% GDP) = gross inflows FDI (% GDP) + gross outflows FDI (% GDP) 
and 
net inflows FDI (%GDP) = gross inflows FDI (% GDP) – gross outflows FDI (% GDP) 
 
Hence, 
gross FDI inflows (% GDP) = [gross FDI (% GDP) + net inflows FDI (% GDP)] /2  
We multiply this by GDP (constant 1995 US$) to obtain gross FDI inflows.  
8 Because data are not available for 1980, we used the earliest available data (usually around 1983 to 1987) for the 
index of corruption and quality of bureaucratic institutions for both time periods. Geographic and distance variables 
are constant. 
9 In the World Bank (2003) categorization, the low- and middle-income group (all developing economies) includes 
those countries in which the 2001 gross national income per capita was US $9,205 or less, as measured in current 
US dollars. The high-income economies are those in which the 2001 gross national income per capita was US 
$9,206 or more.  
10 For example, taking regression 1, the F-test (distributed as a chi-square  (7, 121)) yields a statistic of  2.18, which 
leads us to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients reported in the two sub-samples are the same at the 5% 
significance level. We also reject the commonality of coefficients in regression specification 2, but cannot the null 
hypothesis of equality for regression specifications 3 and 4.    